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Integration of global financial markets was 
supposed to lead to greater financial stability, as 
risks were spread around the world. The finan-
cial crisis has thrown doubt on this conclusion. 
A failure in one part of the global economic 
system caused a global “meltdown.” The recent 
crisis has shown that in the absence of appro-
priate government intervention, privately profit-
able transactions may lead to systemic risk. This 
paper provides a general analytic framework 
within which we can analyze the optimal degree (and form) of financial integration. Within this 
general framework, full integration is not in 
general optimal. Indeed, faced with a choice 
between two polar regimes, full integration or 
autarky, in the simplified model autarky may be 
superior.
I.  The Problem
Those concerned with designing electric net-
works have worried about analogous problems. 
With an integrated electric grid the total capac-
ity required to limit the probability of a black-
out to a particular level can be reduced. But 
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a failure in one part of the system can lead to 
system-wide failure; in the absence of integra-
tion, the failure would have been geographically 
constrained. Well-designed networks have cir-
cuit breakers, to prevent the “contagion” of the 
failure of one part of the system from spreading 
to others. Advocates of unbridled liberalization, 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
have paid little attention to these risks. Indeed, 
in some quarters, such circuit breakers—such as 
the temporary imposition of capital controls—
have been vehemently opposed, even though 
worries about contagion were used to justify 
massive interventions. But diversification and 
contagion are different sides of the same coin: 
greater financial integration (especially if not 
done carefully) increases the risk of adverse 
contagion in the event of a large negative shock. 
An analysis of financial integration should 
weigh the costs with the benefits and begin by 
asking if there are ways of designing the finan-
cial architecture that minimize the downside 
risk while preserving as much of the upside 
potential as possible.
A. The General Framework.
In a series of papers (Bruce Greenwald and 
Stiglitz 2003; Domenico Delli Gatti et al. 2006; 
Mauro Gallegati et al. 2008; Stefano Battiston 
et al. 2009; Stiglitz forthcoming), we have been 
investigating alternative global architectures. 
Simple architectures include autarky, where 
no cross-border capital flows are allowed, and 
regional arrangements, where no restrictions are 
imposed on flows within a group of countries, 
but certain restrictions are allowed in the flows 
between the groups. Restrictions on capital 
flows in times of crisis act as circuit breakers. 
Alternative architectures are evaluated in terms 
of “expected utility,” which takes into account 
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both mean country performance and variability. 
We focus in  particular on how a shock to one 
part of the system (one country) can lead to sys-
temic risk through contagion and amplification 
or how adverse impacts might be diminished 
through risk sharing.
B. First intuition
It is well known that, in the absence of a full 
set of Arrow-Debreu securities or an effective 
surrogate, the Nash equilibrium will not be effi-
cient. The actions of one unit impose externali-
ties on others. Our focus here is on the particular 
set of externalities associated with risk. The 
Greenwald-Stiglitz Fundamental inefficiency 
Theorem (1986) shows that even with rational 
expectations, so long as risk markets are incom-
plete, the market equilibrium will be inefficient. 
As each market participant makes his invest-
ment decision, he affects the price distribution. 
The current crisis illustrates: as each invested 
more and more in housing, the price of (say sub-
prime) housing would be lower in the event of a 
state “s” such that they all (or even many) might 
want to sell. While there is ample evidence that 
market participants did not act rationally, the 
Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem shows that such 
adverse outcomes can happen even had they 
been rational.
In these second-best situations, imposing 
restrictions on the set of interactions (relation-
ships) may be welfare enhancing. For instance, 
trade liberalization between two countries with 
negatively correlated outputs may reduce price 
volatility but increase income volatility, so 
much so that all groups in both countries are 
worse off (David Newbery and Stiglitz 1984). In 
an overlapping generations model, capital mar-
ket liberalization impairs the extent to which a 
productivity shock at one time is “shared” with 
future generations (as increased incomes raise 
savings and thus future wages) and thus can 
lower ex ante expected utility (Stiglitz 2004).
C. second intuition
But there is an even more compelling reason 
that global integration may not be desirable. 
The intuition behind why integration should be 
desirable was based on “convexity”: with convex 
technologies and concave utility functions, risk 
sharing is always beneficial. The more globally 
integrated the world economy, the better risks 
are “dispersed.” But if technologies are not con-
vex, then risk sharing can lower expected utility. 
While simplistic models typically employed in 
economics assume convexity, the world is rife 
with nonconvexities.
This is not the place to provide a catalogue 
of important nonconvexities. Information struc-
tures, learning processes, R&D, and exter-
nalities themselves give rise to a natural set of 
nonconvexities. Bankruptcy introduces a key 
nonconvexity. These in turn may give rise to the 
financial accelerator (Greenwald and Stiglitz 
1993, 2003), which implies that the effect of a 
shock can be amplified and lead to a process 
of trend reinforcement. A firm experiencing a 
negative shock—forcing it closer to the brink 
of bankruptcy—will have to pay higher interest 
rates, implying an increased likelihood of a fur-
ther decline in net worth.
Even without financial market interlink-
ages, there can be extensive interdependencies 
through which a shock in one part of the sys-
tem can be transmitted to others. Liquidity cri-
ses are associated with “forced” sales of assets, 
leading to price declines, adversely affecting 
any collateral-based lending, with obvious 
macroeconomic consequences. Financial link-
ages, while they may enhance risk sharing, may 
increase these adverse effects. Bankruptcy cas-
cades (Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale 2000; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003) illustrate the 
potential adverse effects. The bankruptcy of one 
firm affects the likelihood of the bankruptcy of 
those to whom it owes money, its suppliers, and 
those who might depend upon it for supplies; 
and so actions affecting its likelihood of bank-
ruptcy have adverse effects on others. While 
contracts may try to control the worst actions (e.g., through bond covenants), these are limited 
and only partially effective.
Further externalities are generated as a result 
of information costs and imperfections. If unit 
i doesn’t fully know other units’ characteris-
tics—including the relationships (contracts) of 
those with whom it engages in a relationship, 
including all the relationships in which those 
are engaged, ad infinitum—it cannot know the 
likelihood of their honoring their contract.
The “architecture” of the credit market can 
affect the risk that one bankruptcy leads to a 
sequence of others. If A lends to B, B lends to 
C, and C lends to D, then a default in D can lead 
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to a bankruptcy cascade. On the other hand, if 
all lending goes through a sufficiently well capi-
talized clearinghouse (a bank), then a default 
by one borrower is not as likely to lead to a 
cascade—other things being equal. But other 
things are never equal: the first structure may 
have some informational advantages, if A has (say as a byproduct of its trade relationships with 
B) information about B and its behavior that the 
bank would not have, or could obtain only at a 
high cost.1 Moreover, the “centralized” lending 
architecture may be more vulnerable to shocks 
to the “centers” (illustrated by the global impact 
of the US credit crisis). Architectures that may 
better absorb random uncorrelated shocks may 
perform more poorly in the case of correlated 
shocks (“targeted attacks”); those that absorb 
small to medium shocks may perform more 
poorly in the case of large shocks.
Moreover, in large nonlinear systems with 
complex interactions, even small perturba-
tions can have large consequences; even seem-
ingly small changes in structure (introducing 
new “connections” or contracts) can alter sys-
temic stability. As our financial system became 
increasingly intertwined, through complex 
credit default swaps and other derivatives, too 
little thought was given to these matters by the 
financial wizards that were creating the new 
products, by the bankers that were marketing 
them, by the economists that were touting their 
virtues, and by the regulators and policymakers 
who were responsible for ensuring the overall 
stability of the system.
II.  A Canonical Model
A. The Model
We now consider a polar case focusing on 
losses from system failure. Assume that out-
put in country i is a function of a random vari-
able, si, which can be thought of as the stock 
of available capital. Production is linear in s, 
provided s is greater than some critical num-
ber s *; when s ≤ s*, system failure occurs, and 
a loss of −c occurs. Assume that si  = −α1 
1 While credit interlinkages had been studied prior to 
the crisis (Allen and Gale 2000; Greenwald and Stiglitz 
2003; Gallegati et al. 2008), such interlinkages were obvi-
ously given insufficient attention by regulators and standard 
models. 
with probability p, α2 with probability 1 − p, 
such that pα1 = (1 − p)α2, i.e., expected output without bankruptcy is zero. (This is just a nor-
malization.) For simplicity, we assume s * = 0 
and c < α1 and α2 <  α1, i.e., p <  0.5: there 
is a small probability of “disaster,” which is 
uncorrelated across countries. Prior to liberal-
ization, expected output is −pc +  (1 − p)α2 =  p(α1 − c). We now consider integration 
among N countries. Assume N = 2. With full 
liberalization, Pr (Σsi ≤ 0) = 1 − (1 − p)2 i.e., 
both countries go bankrupt if only one country 
has a bad outcome; and expected output (per 
country) is (1 − p)2α2 – c(1 − (1 − p)2) < −pc + (1 − p)α2.
Liberalization is unambiguously welfare 
decreasing.—A slightly weaker threshold for 
bankruptcy gives more ambiguous results. 
Assume bankruptcy occurs if Σsi/N ≤ k ≤ 0. 
Stiglitz (2010) shows that, for N = 2, there exists 
a critical value of p such that if p ≤ p* (equiva-
lently, α2 ≥ α2* ), liberalization reduces welfare: 
if disaster occurs rarely but seriously, liberal-
ization is undesirable. The critical p* is defined 
by p* = (1 − ς)(1 − 2ς), where ς  ≡ 2k/α1. If ς ≥ 1, then liberalization is always desirable. If ς  = 0 (k = 0)—the case discussed earlier—it 
is never desirable.
More generally, if there are N countries, there 
is a critical p* for each N and k such that if 
p ≤ p*(N, k ) liberalization is not desirable.2 It 
is obvious, using the law of large numbers, that 
if k = 0, as N goes to infinity, crisis (systemic 
failure) occurs with probability one, so full lib-
eralization is never desirable.
B. Further Results
The global financial architecture describes the 
pattern and form of relationships. Stiglitz (2010) 
uses variants of the canonical model (e.g., where 
the probability of failure itself may depend on 
N or where production itself is a concave func-
tion of s above the critical threshold) to exam-
ine the determinants of the desirability of global 
2 It is straightforward to calculate this critical prob-
ability. Define n* as the smallest integer less than α1/α2. 
Assume that n countries have a bad outcome, N − n a good 
outcome. Then, so long as n ≥ n* all countries go into 
bankruptcy. The probability of this can be derived from the 
binomial distribution. 
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 financial integration. Consider a simple global 
financial architecture in which countries are 
divided into “clubs,” and there is full integration 
within the club and no “capital flows” across 
clubs. Under many parametrizations, there is an 
optimal size of the club; i.e., neither autarky nor 
full liberalization is desirable.
The above analysis focused on the polar 
case—full or no risk sharing. There is a grow-
ing consensus that in a financial crisis it may be 
desirable to restrict capital outflows (as under the 
IMF’s program with Iceland). The externalities 
associated with these capital outflows were suf-
ficiently negative that the benefit of the restric-
tion was viewed to exceed the cost. This is an 
example of what we call a circuit breaker, a rule 
that limits the transfer of funds in and out of a 
country under certain circumstances and there-
fore limits the extent to which an adverse effect 
in one country can, through interlinkages, spread 
around the world. Simulations within a variant of 
our model show that an appropriately designed 
circuit breaker can be welfare enhancing.
Our canonical model also assumed sym-
metric relationships in which all ties/contracts 
were identical. In the presence of convexities, 
such symmetric arrangements often character-
ize optimal designs. But that is not so in the 
presence of nonconvexities, and there are many 
alternative architectures. For instance, a set of 
countries can be tightly linked (a “common 
financial market”) to each other, but the links 
among financial markets may be looser. The for-
mer is designed to exploit the advantages of risk 
diversification, the latter to prevent the dangers 
of contagion. Circuit breakers might be absent 
in the former but play a large role in the relations 
among the “common markets.”
III.  Comments on Different Architectures
Our canonical model shows that the risk that a 
firm or a country’s “capital” would fall below the 
threshold level could increase with integration. 
With downward amplification and correlation, 
the risks of adverse outcomes are even greater. 
But in fact, as recent and earlier crises illustrate, 
many firms (countries) undertake similar activi-
ties. Indeed, implicit compensation structures 
often encourage them to do that. It means that 
they are unlikely to do much worse than oth-
ers—and with everyone being graded on the 
curve, that is what matters. It can be shown that 
there are (from a social perspective) incentives 
for undertaking excessively correlated strate-
gies. But even without such correlated business 
strategies, common macroeconomic shocks can 
induce high levels of correlation, and with cor-
relation the benefits of risk diversification are 
reduced and the risks of contagion increased. 
As we noted earlier, the relative performance of 
different architectures may depend on the extent 
of correlation of shocks and behaviors.
This analysis also ignores the diminution of 
asset quality that results from increasing infor-
mation imperfections typically associated with 
more extensive financial market integration, and 
especially securitization. On the other hand, our 
analysis has omitted the benefits from risk shar-
ing in good states—the production function is 
linear above s *. Still, simulation exercises, com-
bined with intuitions about diminishing returns 
to risk sharing, suggest that full integration may 
not be desirable even with reasonable degrees of 
concavity of the production function.
A. Other Applications
While our analysis has focused on global 
financial integration, many of the same issues 
arise domestically. For instance, if a country has 
a number of universal banks following corre-
lated strategies, then episodically, such a coun-
try might face systemic crises. By contrast, if 
a country developed specialized banking insti-
tutions subject to quite different shocks, they 
may not all fail contemporaneously. While the 
real estate banks may fail more often than they 
would if they were more diversified, the finan-
cial system as a whole might fail less frequently, 
particularly if there were provisions for expan-
sion of sector banks into other areas in times of 
exigencies. By the same token, financial link-
ages across firms, e.g., through credit default 
swaps, may amplify systemic vulnerabilities.
B. concluding comments
This paper, focusing on risk, has just touched 
the surface of the complexities of optimal finan-
cial architectures. Even ignoring issues raised 
by learning, information asymmetries, and 
institutional coordination, it has been shown 
that full integration may be less desirable than 
previously thought. There is a rich policy and 
research agenda ahead.
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